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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-CHANGE oF VENUE-CONGESTION oF DoCKET As A
FACTOR AFFECTING TRANSFER UNDER SECTION 1404(a)-Plaintiff sued in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover
damages under the Jones Act for illness sustained while he was serving as a
seaman on the defendant's steamship. The defendant moved to transfer the
action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) which provides: "For the convenience of
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parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."1
Evidence introduced showed that the defendant was a California corporation
with its principal offices in San Francisco where its shipping records were
maintained, that the plaintiff was also a resident of California, and that 36
of the 43 potential witnesses for both parties were also from California. The
court also took into consideration the congested condition of its own trial
calendar. Statistics showed that, while the median time required in the California
district from the time of filing to disposition of normal civil cases in which a
trial was held was 11 months; in the New York district it was 35.4 months, the
maximum. The median interval from issue to trial in the California district was
5.7 months; in the New York district it was 28.5 months, again the maximum.
Transfer ordered. The convenience of the parties and witnesses and the prompt
and efficient administration of justice require transfer of this case. Ortiz v.
Union Oil Co. of California, (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 102 F. Supp. 492.
Ordinarily the plaintiff's choice of forum will not be disturbed and the burden
is on the defendant to show a strong balance of convenience in his favor. 2 In
ordering transfer in the principal case, the court weighed the plaintiff's venue
privilege against not only the convenience of the respective parties and the
availability of the witnesses but also the public interest in avoiding the administrative difficulties created by a congested docket. While the convenience factors
alone would seem to be a sound basis for this transfer, it is notewo;thy that the
court emphasized prompt administration of justice to the extent of making a
detailed investigation into the relative congestion of the calendars of both the
transferor and transferee districts. A review of the cases discloses that the courts
appear to agree that the condition of the respective trial calendars is a factor
to be considered in applying section 1404(a).3 Support for the inclusion of
this consideration is found in the words "in the interest of justice" which have
been interpreted to be a reason separate and distinct from the convenience of the
parties.4 In addition to hindering the efficient administration of the court's
business, a congested ~alendar may impose the hardship of undue delay upon
162 Stat. L. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. ill, 1950) §l404(a).
Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, (2d Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 329; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947).
3 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 1, at 508, Justice Jackson observed: "Factors
of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine [forum non conveniens]. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up at congested centers instead
of being handled at its origin." Section 1404(a) differs from its common law predecessor,
forum non conveniens, only in substituting transfer for dismissal and consequently these
comments have been held equally applicable in determining whether a change of venue
would be in the interest of justice under the language of this section.
4 Webster-Chicago Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., (D.C. Del. 1951)
99 F. Supp. 503; Cinema Amusements, Inc., v. Loew's, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1949) 85 F. Supp.
319. See also Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., (3d Cir. 1948) 170 F. (2d) 707, where
reference is made to the Reviser's notes to §l404(a).
·
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local litigants who have no choice of forum.5 and could also result in the burden
of excessive jury duty upon a community which has no relation to the litigation. 6
While transfer has not been granted solely on the basis of a less congested
calendar in the transferee district,7 the decision"s are at variance as to the
emphasis to be placed upon this factor. Whereas some courts have treated this
as only a "slight" factor, 8 others have considered it to be "vital."9 Without
questioning the merit behind these considerations, it is submitted that there is
a danger in over-emphasizing their effect on transfer. Whenever a court follows
the policy of considering those factors which do not affect the interests of the
parties to the suit, it is unavoidably faced with the temptation of facilitating
its own administrative problems and benefiting its own litigants at the expense
of the transferee district. The greater weight given to the congested condition
of its own calendar in ordering transfer, the greater will be the appearance of
self interest. It is not difficult to visualize a possible build-up of animosity
between the district courts which could result in a breakdown of the transfer
system. The writer believes that this problem can largely be avoided by minimizing the effect of a congested calendar and then considering it only when
the disparity in the respective calendar congestion is great enough to have a
real effect on the interest of justice.
Peter Van Domelen, S.Ed.

5 This factor was given primary recognition in applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in state courts, Collard v. Beach, 93 App. Div. 339, 87 N.Y.S. 884 (1904),
and has also been considered in granting transfer under §1404(a), United States v. E. I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., (D.C. D.C. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 233.
6 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note I.
7 Mazinski v. Dight, (D.C. Pa. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 192. In Keller-Dorian Color61m
Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 88 F. Supp. 863, the court in denying
transfer stated that, although the granting of transfer would naturally serve the convenience
of the court and of other litigants with pending cases, no court may order such a transfer
merely to serve its personal convenience.
8 Henderson v. American Airlines, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 191. While denying transfer in United States v. Scott and Williams, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 531,
the court expressed the view that if the factor of public interest were to be given major
recognition nearly all of the applications for transfer under §l404(a) would have to be
granted because of the generally recognized congested conditions existing in its district.
9 United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra note 5. The language used
in Koster v. American Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518 at 524, 67 S.Ct.
828 (1947), decided under the doctrine of forum non conveniens before the enactment of
§1404 (a), would seem to indicate that considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems could alone be sufficient grounds for transfer. Cf. Walsh v.
Pullman Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 89 F. Supp. 762.

